Power to Appoint for a Non-Charitable Purpose: A Duologue or Endacott\u27s Ghost by Sheridan, L. A.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1964 Article 3 
Power to Appoint for a Non-Charitable Purpose: A Duologue or 
Endacott's Ghost 
L. A. Sheridan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
L. A. Sheridan, Power to Appoint for a Non-Charitable Purpose: A Duologue or Endacott's Ghost, 13 
DePaul L. Rev. 210 (1964) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol13/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
POWER TO APPOINT FOR A NON-CHARITABLE PUR-
POSE: A DUOLOGUE OR ENDACOTT'S GHOST
L. A. SHERIDAN
BE ING an Englishman, during his life Endacott could consult his
counsel only through the medium of a solicitor. Now that he
has gone to that land from which no frustrated litigant returns,
communication is even more cumbersome. Fortunately, however, a
record exists of what is believed to be the most literal post mortem
examination of a decided case, when Endacott was enabled to consult
his counsel through the solicitation of a medium....
Counsel: I am ready. Are you there? Welcome to my chambers.
Endacott: I am here.
Counsel: Tell me your problem.
I
Endacott: When I was alive, I made a will, and after other gifts, I
said, "Everything else I leave to North Tawton Devon Parish Council
for the purpose of providing some useful memorial to myself. .. ."
When I was newly peaceful in my grave, the Court of Appeal' said
this was a void trust. I have been turning this over in my mind as I
turn in my grave. Can it be that the Endacott desire for a useful
memorial is in justice to result in the useless memorial called Re Enda-
cott? What justice is there in this? And why did Lord Evershed M.R.
add also "that, in my judgment, the proposition stated in Mr. Morris
and Professor Barton Leach's book (p. 308) that if these trusts should
fail as trusts they may survive as powers, is not one which I think can
be treated as accepted in English law"?2 What are "these" trusts?
Why are they void? Why cannot they survive as powers? What does
it mean? What are Mr. Morris and Professor Leach doing about it?
Counsel: Your questions are many and some are difficult. Let us
commence with the first: "these" trusts are found in cases where
1 [1960] Ch. 232, [1959] 3 W.L.R. 799, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562, 103 S.J. 918, 58 L.G.R. 25
(1959) (C.A.) (if you will pardon my speaking in footnotes).
2 (1960) Ch. at 246.
Professor of Law in the Queen's University of Belfast, United Kingdom.
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property is vested in trustees and no persons are named as beneficiaries,
but purposes are stated which are not charitable.
Why are they void? Well, indeed, they are not all void. There are
cases in which some examples have been upheld. But of them, Lord
Evershed M.R. said: "Still, in my judgment, the scope of these cases
(and I can call them anomalous because they have been so called both
in the book of Mr. Morris and Professor Barton Leach and in the
course of the argument) ought not to be extended. So to do would be
to validate almost limitless heads of non-charitable trusts, even though
they were not (strictly speaking) public trusts, so long only as the
question of perpetuities did not arise; and, in my judgment, that result
would be out of harmony with the principles of our law. No prin-
ciple, perhaps, has greater sanction or authority behind it than the
general proposition that a trust by English law, not being a charitable
trust, in order to be effective, must have ascertained or ascertainable
beneficiaries. These cases constitute an exception to that general
rule."3
Endacott: Wherein lies the disharmony? What is wrong with valid
limitless heads of non-charitable trusts?
Counsel: It is generally accepted nowadays that Underhill was right
when he wrote: "A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person
(who is called a trustee) to deal with property over which he has
control (which is called the trust property), for the benefit of per-
sons (who are called the beneficiaries or cestuis que trust), of whom
he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obliga-
tion.
Underhill was referring to the private, or non-charitable trust (the
Court of Appeal held your residuary gift not charitable), and only a
person can be a beneficiary. You specified no person to benefit; there
was no obligation because there was no one who could enforce it.
Roxburgh J. held in Re Astor's Settlement Trusts5 that an attempt to
3 Ibid.
4 Underhill, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, I1th ed. (1959), p. 3.
5 [1952] Ch. 534, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1003, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1067, 96 S.J. 246. This trust
was also held void on the ground of uncertainty of the purposes. In England, the rule
against non-charitable purpose trusts is thought to originate with Morice v. Bishop of
Durham 9 Ves. Jr, 399, 32 E.R. 656 (1804) (Grant, M.R.), 10 Ves. Jr. 522, 32 E.R. 947
(1805) (Lord Eldon), where uncertainty also existed. Other such holdings or dicta
are to be found in Re Barnett 24 T.L.R. 788 (1908) (Parker, J.), where the Rule Against
Perpetuities was also infringed; Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd. [1917] A.C. 406, 441,
86 L.J. Ch. 568, 117 L.T. 161, 170, 33 T.L.R. 376, 61 S.J. 478 (H.L.), per Lord Parker
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create a trust for non-charitable purposes failed as an express trust and
gave rise to a resulting trust in favour of the donor or his representa-
tives.
Endacott: But did not both you and Lord Evershed say that these
non-charitable purposes have sometimes been upheld?
Counsel: Yes. Such gifts have been held valid when given for tombs
and monuments...
Endacott: But...
Counsel: Let me give the full list first: tombs and monuments,6 the
of Waddington (also uncertainty); Re Wood [1949] Ch. 498, [1949] 1 All E.R. 1100,[1949] L.J.R. 1509, 93 S.J. 357 (Harman, J.) (also uncertainty); and Re Shaw [1957]
1 W.L.R. 729, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745, 101 S.J. 408 (Harman, J.) (also uncertainty).
In Australia, the rule against non-charitable purpose trusts was the sole ground of the
decision of Roper J. in Public Trustee v. Nolan [1943] 43 S.R. (N.S.W.) 169, 60 (Sup.
Ct.) 84, and this was followed by Smith J. in Re Producers' Defence Fund [1954] Argus
L.R. 541, [1954] V.L.R. 246 (Sup. Ct.), where the Rule Against Perpetuities was also
infringed. In Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. [1959] 76
W.N. (N.S.W.) 226 (Sup. Ct.), Else Mitchell, J. held void for uncertainty and per-
petuity a gift "to the Proprietors for the time being of the Sydney Morning Herald
for appropriation by them in their absolute discretion for the advancement of deserving
journalists but in such manner as will perpetrate [sic] the name of my late father .. "
The learned judge said (at 228): "I should have been disposed to the view that the
so-called trusts of imperfect obligation relating to animals, graves and monuments
are not really trusts at all; they are merely testamentary directions which a trustee
may follow within the limits set by the Rule Against Perpetuities without being liablefor breach of trust at the suit of a beneficiary such as a residuary legatee or a remainder-
man. In some cases, they have been described as powers in the nature of trusts, but this
seems equally to misconceive their real character as mere unenforceable testamentary
directions." (This is a novel formulation, and one which does not as obviously as the
learned judge evidently considered, result in the application of trust-like criteria of
certainty.)
See also Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445 (1881) (Gray, C. J.).Roxburgh J.'s decision is discussed by Marshall, The Failure of the Astor Trust(1953) 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 151 and in Trusts for Non-charitable Purposes(1953) 17 CoNvEY (N.S.) 46. Support for the rule against non-charitable purpose trusts
is given by Gray, Gifts for a Non-Charitable Purpose (1902) 15 HARV. L. REV. 509 and
by Sweet, Restraints on Alienation" 33 L.Q.R. 342 (1917). See also L. A. Sheridan
Purpose Trusts and Powers 4 UNIv. OF W. AUSTR. ANN. L. REV. 235. As to trusts for
non-charitable purposes generally, see MORRIS & LEACH, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
(2nd ed.), 307-27.
6 Mellick v. President and Guardians of the Asylum, Jac. 180, 37 E.R. 818 (1821)
(Plumer, M. R.) (to erect a monument to the testator's memory); Adnam v. Cole
6 Beav. 353, 49 E.R. 862 (1843) (Lord Langdale, M. R.) (to erect such monument
as the trustees thought fit); Trimmer v. Danby [1856] 4 W.R. 430, 25 L.J. Ch. 424,
20 J.P. 709, 2 Jur. N.S. 367 (Kindersley, V.-C.) ("to erect a monument to my memory
in St. Paul's Cathedral, among those of my brothers in art"); Mussett v. Bingle [1876]
W.N. 170 (Hall, V.-C.) (to erect a monument to the testator's wife's first husband);
Pirbright v. Salwey [1896] W.N. 86 (Stirling, J.) (to keep up and decorate a family
burial enclosure); Re Hooper [1932] 1 Ch. 38, 101 L.J. Ch. 61, 146 L.T. 208 (Maugham,
J. (for the care and upkeep of a vault and certain graves and monuments); Re Filshie
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support of the donor's animals,7 non-charitable religious purposes,8 the
furtherance of foxhunting,9 the abolition of vivisection and the pro-
[1939] N.Z.L.R. 91, 15 N.Z.L.J. 6 (Northcroft, J.) (New Zealand) (to erect suitable
kerbing and headstones over the graves of the testatrix and her husband, father, mother,
brother and sister); Re Conner [1960] I.R. 67 (Haugh, J.) (Republic of Ireland) (for
the maintenance and care of the famil- vault).
In Scotland, in M'Caig v. Glasgow University [1907] S.C. 231, 44 S.L.R. 198, 14 S.L.T.
600 (Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords Kyllachy, Stormonth-Darling, and Low), a monu-
ment trust was held void for want of a beneficiary. A testator set up a trust and
described the objects as being the erection of monuments and statues of himself and
his brothers, sisters, father and mother, and of artistic towers at prominent points on his
estates. Declining to hold the purposes contrary to public policy, the Court of Session
proceeded on the basis that mere disinheritance was not valid without giving the
property to someone. This point of view was upheld in M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk.
Session of the United Free Church of Lismore [1915] S.C. 426, 52 S.L.R. 347, [1915]
1 S.L.T. 152 (Lords Salvesen, Guthrie and the Lord Justice-Clerk), where, however,
it was suggested that there were exceptions in respect of the provision of a burial place
and the erection and repair of a suitable monument for the testator, as well as the
making of statues of or memorials to historical personages or local celebrities. Here,
the testatrix left property for the erection and upkeep of bronze statues of her parents
and nine children, each statue to cost at least C 1000. This was held void both for want
of a beneficiary and as contrary to public policy by virtue of the grossness of the
proportions of the gift. (This latter topic is not considered in this conversation.) In
Aitken's Trustees v. Aitken [1927] S.C. 374, [1927] S.L.T. 308, [1927] S.N. 26, only
Lord Blackburn was for striking down the trust for want of a beneficiary. The gift
was for "a massive equestrian bronze statue of artistic merit, representing me as
Champion at the Riding of the Towns Marches. . . ." The testator estimated the cost
of construction at L 5,000 or more. Lord Sands said there was no principle that required
a beneficiary; the purpose, to keep the testator's memory alive, was reasonable, but the
gift was void because it was for an "irrational, futile, and self-destructive scheme ... "
(p. 383): "The statue's erection would cause the memory of the testator to stink in the
nostrils of the community of Mussleburgh.. . " ([1927] S.C. at 382, [1927] S.L.T. at 312).
Lord Blackburn held the gift void for want of a beneficiary and as contrary to public
policy. Lord Ashmore based the voidness not on the absence of a beneficiary, but on the
absence of a benefit to anyone.
See also ScoTT, TRUSTS (2nd ed.), vol. 2, 871, F.N. 1, 872, F.N. 3.
Cf. Re Voorhis' Estate, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 818, 176 Misc. 585 (1941); Murr v. Youse, 80 N.E.
2d 788, 797-99, 52 Ohio Abs. 321 (1946).
7 Pettingall v. Pettingall [1842] 11 L.J. Ch. 176 (Knight Bruce, V.-C.) (for the mainte-
nance of a favourite black mare); Re Dean [1889] 41 Ch.D. 552, 58 L.J.Ch. 693, 60 L.T.
813, 5 T.L.R. 404 (North, J.) (to maintain the testator's horses and hounds). In the
Irish Free State, in Re Kelly [1932] I.R. 255, [1932] L.J.Ir. 93, Meredith, J. upheld
a bequest for the support of dogs. See also Scott, TRUSTS (2nd ed.), vol. 2, 877, F.N. 2.
8 Irelind: Phelan v. Slattery [1887] 19 L.R.Ir. 177 (Chatterton, V.-C.) (for the saying
of Masses, before this was held to be a charitable purpose); Bradshaw v. Jackman [1887]
21 L.R.Ir. 12 (Porter, M.R.) (masses); Reichenbach v. Quinn 21 L.R.Ir. 138 (1888)
(Chatterton, V.-C.) (masses); Re Gibbons [1917] 1 I.R. 448 (Barton, J.) (to dispose
of residue "to my best spiritual advantage, as conscience and sense of duty may direct");
Re Ryan's Will Trusts [1925] 60 I.L.T.R. 57 (H.C.) (Johnston, J.) ("for my spiritual
benefit"); Re Byrne (1935) I.R. 782 (Supreme Court) ("to be expended for my spiritual
benefit.... ."; Re Keogh's Estate [1945] I.R. 13 (Overend, J.) ("for the purposes of the
[Carmelite] Order in the Irish Free State").
As to England, see Bourne v. Keane [1919] A.C. 815, 89 L.J.Ch. 17, 121 L.T. 426, 35
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tection of animals, 10 discretionary trusts," and trusts for paying
debts.12
Endacott: Did I not leave my residue for a monument? Besides,
how is it that the upholding of some non-charitable purposes has not
given rise to a general principle that they are valid? Or, if there is a
general principle that they are invalid, how were some upheld?
Counsel: Some people have thought there was a principle that non-
charitable-purpose trusts were valid. This was the opinion of North J.
in Re Dan"3 and Romer J. in Re Clarke.4 But the predominant view
expressed recently is that of Roxburgh J. in Re Aastor's Settlement
Trusts15 that equitable rights under a trust had been hammered out
T.L.R. 560, 63 S.J. 606 (H.L.).
As to the United States generally, see Sco-rr, TRUSTS, (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 881, F.N. 5.
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church of Mobile,
104 Ala. 327, 25 L.R.A. 360, 18 So. 394, 53 Am. St. Rep. 48, (1893) struck down a bequest
of $2000 to the defendant church "to be used in solemn masses for the repose of my
soul." Head, J., giving the judgment of the court, having held the bequest neither
to the church for its general purposes nor charitable, said (104 Ala. 327, 330): "It is
not valid as a private trust for the want of a living beneficiary. A trust in form,
with none to enjoy or enforce the use, is no trust."
In Wisconsin, before the Supreme Court held gifts for masses charitable (Re
Kavanaugh's Estate, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N.W. 672 (1910) 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 470), the same
result had been achieved as in Alabama: McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N.W. 631,
40 L.R.A. 724, 65 Am. St. Rep. 106 (1897).
As to New York before the Tilden Act, see Holland v. Alcock, 108 N.Y. 312, 16 N.E.
305, 2 Am. St. Rep. 420 (Court of Appeals) (1888).
9 Re Thompson [1934] Ch. 342, 103 L.J.Ch. 162, 150 L.T. 451 (Clauson J.).
10 Ireland: Armstrong v. Reeves 25 L.R.Ir. 325 (1890) (Chatterton, V.-C.).
11 See L. A. Sheridan, Discretionary Trusts 21 CoNvEY N.S. 55 (1957); ScoTT, TRUSTS
(2nd ed.), vol. 2, 1083-1132; Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1961).
"In a discretionary trust the beneficiary has no definitely ascertainable interest....
Viewed in another way, the discretion in a trustee to distribute principal and income
to any or all members of a designated class is tantamount to a special power of appoint-
ment." (Per Mereick, J., Thomas v. Harrison, 240 Ohio 2d 148, 191 N.E. 2d 862, 866
(1962).)
12 See L. A. Sheridan, Trusts for Paying Debts (1957) 21 CONVEY N.S. 280; ScoTT,
TRUSTS (2nd ed.), vol. 3, p. 2398.
13 [1889] 41 Ch.D. 552, 556-7, 58 L.J.Ch. 693, 60 L.T. 813, 5 T.L.R. 404.
14 [1923] 2 Ch. 407, 417-18, 92 L.J.Ch. 629, 129 L.T. 310, 39 T.L.R. 433, 67 S.J. 680.
15 [1952] Ch. 534, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1003, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1067, 96 S.J. 246. But see
ScoTT, TRUSTS (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 1507, F.N. 5, citing cases where the court has sug-
gested that it could take the initiative to compel a trustee to perform a non-charitable-
purpose trust. Cf. Fidelity Title and Trust Co. v. Clyde, 143 Conn. 247, 256, 121 A. 2d
625, 630 (1956) per O'Sullivan, J., Inglis, C. J., and Baldwin, Wynne and Daly, J. J.
concurring. In Re Sill's Estate, 41 Misc. 270, 271, 84 N.Y.S. 213 (1903) the testatrix
had given "one hundred and fifty dollars for the repairing and keeping in repair
the cemetary on the Maples farm in Hartwick. I will that an iron fence be placed
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in litigation between beneficiary and trustee and that there could,
therefore, be no trust without a correlative right; also, that there was
a practical objection to large funds being in the hands of trustees
whom no one could control.
Endacott: Then does this view not apply in the cases when non-
charitable-purpose trusts were upheld?
Counsel: Roxburgh J. said these cases were "anomalous [the word
used in your case] and exceptional," and that they concerned "matters
arising under wills and intimately connected with the deceased" and
were probably "concessions to human weakness or sentiment."' 151
Endacott: How could the Jesuit Order, the Carmelite Order, the
furtherance of foxhunting, the abolition of vivisection or the protec-
tion of animals be regarded as intimately connected with the de-
ceased?
Counsel: All your examples, except the furtherance of foxhunting,
are drawn from Irish cases. They may not be followed anywhere
else. As to foxhunting, perhaps Re Thompson16 is one of the cases
Harman L.J. had in mind when he said of your gift, "As for estab-
lishing it without the crutch of charity, I applaud the orthodox sen-
timents expressed by Roxburgh J. in the Astor case,11a and I think, as
he did, that though one knows there have been decisions at times
which are not really to be satisfactorily classified, but are perhaps
merely occasions when Homer has nodded, at any rate these cases
stand by themselves and ought not to be increased in number, nor
indeed followed, except where the one is exactly like another."'17
around it at a reasonable cost." Willis, J. said (41 Misc. at 273-74, 84 N.Y.S. at 215):
"Assuming the provision of the will above cited to provide a permanent trust fund
for the care and maintenance, in a suitable manner, of the said cemetery lot, who
would be the proper person or persons to enforce the performance of the trust duties
voluntarily assumed by the trustee? If the contention of the petitioner is correct that
the next of kin have no interest in this trust entitling them to enforce its provisions,
then it would seem to me that all that it would be necessary for a trustee to do, after
obtaining possession of the trust fund, would be to ignore the trust entirely, with the
assurance that there could not be the slightest possibility of his being called to an
account by any person. It seems to me that some person must have the right, under
section 2803 of the Code, as one interested in the application of the trust fund, or
of the income or other proceeds thereof, to see that the trust is properly carried out.
In this case who could it be if not the next of kin of the testatrix?"
15a [1952] Ch. 534, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1003, [1952] 1 All. E.R. 1067, 96 S.J. 246.
16 [1934] Ch. 342, 103 L.J. Ch. 162, 150 L.T. 451.
16a [1952] Ch. 534, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1003, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1067, 96 S.J. 246.
17 Re Endacott, [1960] Ch. 232, 250-251, [1959] 3 W.L.R. 799 [1959] 3 All E.R. 562,
103 S.J. 918, 58 L.G.R. 25 (C.A.).
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Endacott: Then I come back to asking you: did I not leave my
residue for a monument?
Counsel: You actually said, "for the purpose of providing some use-
ful memorial to myself. . . ." Now I do not say that there is neces-
sarily any distinction between a monument and a memorial, but you
prescribed a useful memorial. This is uncertain. Lord Evershed M.R.
declared, "[t]hough this trust is specific, in the sense that it indicates a
purpose capable of expression, yet it is of far too wide and uncertain
a nature to qualify within the class of cases cited."1 8
Endacott: Do the judges not know what is useful?
Counsel: The judges may be certain that some things are useful and
certain that other things are not useful, but there may be yet other
things of which they can conceive and which they cannot confi-
dently classify as useful or useless.
Endacott: But what the North Tawton Parish Council wanted to
do with the money would surely be useful.
Counsel: That is irrelevant. Where there is a trust, it must be pos-
sible, at its inception, to list all the possible proper objects of the
trust.19 General words like "useful" which have failed in the past in
England on this test of certainty include "objects of benevolence and
liberality,"2 "deserving objects,"'' "patriotic ' 22 and "benevolent" 23
purposes, and "worthy objects. ' 2 4 The experience of other countries
has been similar. 5
18 [1960] Ch. at 247.
19 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch. 20, [1954]
3 W.L.R. 438, [1954] 3 All E.R. 120, 98 S.J. 588, 35 T.C. 577, 585 (1954) (C.A.);
Re Sayer Trust [1957] Ch. 423, [1957] 2 W.L.R. 261, [1956] 3 All E.R. 600, 101 S.J. 481
(1956) (Wynn-Parry, J.); Re Hain's Settlement [1961] 1 All E.R. 848, [1961] 1 W.L.R.
440, 105 S.J. 154 (C.A.); Re Saxone Shoe Co. Ltd's. Trust Deed [1962] 1 W.L.R. 943,
[1962] 2 All E.R. 904, 106 S.J. 687 (Cross J.). See also Re William's Estate, 167 Wash. 524,
10 P. 2d 219 (1932).
2 0 Morice v. Bishop of Durham [1805] 10 Ves. Jr. 522, 32 E.R. 947 (Lord Eldon).
21 Re Sutton [1885] 28 Ch.D. 464, 54 L.J. Ch. 613, 33 W.R. 519 (Pearson, J.).
22 A.-G. v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] A.C. 262, 131 L.T.
34, 93 L.J. Ch. 231, 40 T.L.R. 191, 68 S.J. 235 (H.L.).
23 Chichester Diocesan Fund & Board of Finance (Incorporated) v. Simpson [1944]
A.C. 341, [1944] 2 All E.R. 60, 113 L.J.Ch. 225, 171 L.T. 141, 60 T.L.R. 492, 88 S.J. 246
(H.L.). Cf. Re Dulles's Estate and Cochran v. McLaughlin, F.N. 52, post.
24 Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund [1958] Ch. 300, 305, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 1069, [1958]
1 All E.R. 37, 101 S.J. 974 (Harman, J.), affd., [1959] Ch. 62, 69, [1958] 3 W.L.R. 325,
[1958] 2 All E.R. 749, 102 S.J. 581 (C.A.), per Lord Evershed, M.R.
25 Scotland: Blair v. Duncan [1902] A.C. 37, 71 L.J.P.C. 22, 86 L.T. 157, 50 W.R. 369,
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Endacott: So the position is that if I wanted something done and
the parish council were going to do what I wanted, they could be
stopped, because they might have decided to do something of which
it could be said that it was doubtful whether I wanted it or not: and
the money is therefore given to someone I clearly did not want to
get it. Is that the law?
Counsel: If you make a trust-if you place an obligation on some-
one to do something-it must be clear what he can be compelled to do.
Endacott: But you said earlier that only a person could be bene-
ficiary and compel performance of a trust. If I had said I wanted a
monument to myself, you say that would have been valid because it
is certain enough to be enforced: but it cannot be enforced because
there is no beneficiary: so why does it have to be certain enough to
be enforced?
Counsel: The courts have said that in general there must be a bene-
ficiary for a non-charitable trust to be valid. There are anomalous
exceptions, but though these are cases where the trust cannot be en-
forced, they are valid only if so certain that they pass the test of cer-
tainty for enforceable trusts. Some people think these dispositions
18 T.L.R. 194 (H.L.); Grimond v. Grimond [1905] A.C. 124, 74 L.J.P.C. 35, 92 L.T.
477, 21 T.L.R. 323 (H.L.); Houston v. Burns [1918] A.C. 337, 87 L.J.P.C. 99, 118 L.T.
462, 34 T.L.R. 219 (H.L.).
Australia: A.-G. for New South Wales v. Metcalf [1904] 1 C.L.R. 421 [1904] 4 S.R.
(N.S.W.) 175 sub nom. Metcalfe v. O'Kennedy (High Court); A.-G. for New South
Wales v. Adams (1908) 7 C.L.R. 100 (High Court); Re Dobinson (1911) [1911] V.L.R.
300 17 A.L.R. 280 (Victoria, Cussen, J.); In the Will of Forrest (1913) 19 Argus L.R.
414 [1913] V.L.R. 415 (Victoria, Madden, C.J.); Re White [1933] S.A.S.R. 129 (South
Australia, Richards, J.); Re Boland [1950] Q.S.R. 45 (Queensland, Full Court); Re
Edwards (1952) S.A.S.R. 67 (South Australia, Napier, C.J.).
Canada: Brewster v. Foreign Mission Board of Baptist Convention of Maritime
Provinces [1900] 21 C.L.T. 131, 2 N.B.Eq. Rep. 172 (New Brunswick, Barker, J.);
Lawrence v. Lawrence [1913] 13 D.L.R. 737, 42 N.B.R. 260, 13 E.L.R. 519 (New
Brunswick, Barker, C.J.); Re Greaves [1917] 1 W.W.R. 997 (British Columbia, Clement,
J.); Cameron v. Church of Christ, Scientist [1918] 43 D.L.R. 668, 57 S.C.R. 298 (Supreme
Court); Re McPherson (1919) 17 O.W.N. 22 (Ontario, Kelly, J.); Re Street (1926) 29
O.W.N. 428 (Ontario, Lennox, J.); Re Hawkins (1929) 36 O.W.N. 347 (Ontario,
Kelly, J.); Planta v. Greenshields [1931] 2 D.L.R. 189, [1931] 1 W.W.R. 401, 43 B.C.R.
439 (British Columbia, C.A.); Re Poole (1931) 40 O.W.N. 558 (Ontario, Riddell, J.A.);
Re Metcalfe (1946) O.R. 882 (Ontario, Barlow, J.); Re Eacrett [1949] 1 D.L.R. 305,
[1949] O.R. 1, O.W.N. 10 (Ontario, C.A.); Re Loney Estate [1953] 9 W.W.R. (N.S.)
366 (Manitoba, Du Val, J.); Brewer v. McCauley [1955] 1 D.L.R. 415, [1954] S.C.R. 645
(Supreme Court); Re Delaney (1957) 10 D.L.R. (2d) 213, 22 W.W.R. 574 (British
Columbia, Macfarlane, J.).
New Zealand: A.-G. for New Zealand v. Brown [1917] A.C. 393 (P.C.) 86 L.J.P.C.
132, 116 L.T. 624, 33 T.L.R. 294 (P.C.); A.-G. of New Zealand v. New Zealand Insur-
ance Co., Ltd. [1936] 3 All E.R. 888, 53 T.L.R. 37, 805 J. 912 (P.C.).
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should have been treated as powers. That might affect the uncertainty
question, but...
Endacott: Yes, I know that view has not been accepted. I have asked
you why already and I mean to return to that question. But first tell
me: did I really create a trust?
Counsel: The Court of Appeal held you did.
Endacott: But did I?
Counsel: The Court of Appeal held you did, and that means you
did. Lord Evershed M.R. said you intended to create a trust.2"
Endacott: A thing that puzzled me in the judgment in my case was
that "suitable" might have been suitable when "useful" was useless.
Did not Lord Evershed refer to an unreported case where a gift for
a suitable memorial was upheld?
Counsel: Lord Evershed M.R. did indeed quote from the judgment
of Roxburgh J. in Re Catheral2 7 as follows: "I could construe the
words as meaning such purposes (of a religious character) as they
may think fit, being suitable as a memorial; that is, charitable; or I
could construe the words as meaning any purpose suitable as a me-
morial; that is, non-charitable. But there is another ground on which
this trust can be upheld. It is not perpetuitous. I went into these cases
in In re Astor.25 Such a trust as this is valid whether charitable or not.
Purpose must embody a definite concept, and means to attain it must
be described with sufficient certainty. In this case I should have no
difficulty in deciding what would be a suitable memorial. ' 29 But Lord
Evershed certainly did not seem to like this decision, at least on the
ground given for it.
Endacott: Yet was this not the same Roxburgh J. whose orthodox
sentiments in the Astor case were applauded by Harmon L.J. in my
case? And in any case, does it not suggest that if I had just asked for
a memorial to myself, that would have been valid?
Counsel: Probably.
Endacott: And I messed things up by stipulating usefulness?
Counsel: Quite likely.
26 Re Endacott [1960] Ch. 232, 241, [1959] 3 W.L.R. 799, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562, 103
S.J. 918, 58 L.G.R. 25. See Marshall, Trusts and Powers (1957) 35 CANADIAN BAR REV.
1060.
27 1958, unreported.
28 (1960) Ch. 232, 248-49, [1959] 3 W.L.R. 799, [1959] 3 All E.R. 562, 103 S.J. 918,
58 L.G.R. 25.
2 9 Re Astor's Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch. 534, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1003; (1952) 1 All E.R.
1067, 96 S.J. 246.
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Endacott: And if I had just said unadjectival "memorial" the parish
council would have been free to use the money for a useful memorial
because I had left them free to put up a useless one?
Counsel: It would seem so, though it would be anomalous and ex-
ceptional; and by leaving out usefulness you might have made the
memorial something intimately connected with yourself and thus
have exacted a concession to your mortal human weakness already
then sadly passed away.
Endacott: What, then, is the policy behind all these distinctions?
Counsel: Policy? It is not a question of policy; it is a question of
law.
Endacott: Does not the law in general allow testators freedom to
choose the posthumous destination of their property?
Counsel: In general, yes.
Endacott: And when this freedom is partially withdrawn, must
there not be some reason?
Counsel: Yes.
Endacott: Then for what reason does the law defeat my particular
gift?
Counsel: If you mean that it seems strange that gifts for monu-
ments are allowed unless the monument is prescribed to be useful, it
must be understood that you sought to compel someone to do some-
thing and, first, laid out a vague criterion as to what he could be com-
pelled to do and, secondly, provided no machinery for compelling
him.
Endacott: You keep speaking about compulsion as though the parish
council were recalcitrant. No one was trying in court to compel them
to do anything. Someone was trying, successfully, to stop them from
carrying out my wishes. Even if they could not be compelled (had
that question arisen), why should they not have been allowed?
Counsel: Now you are saying your disposition should have been
treated as a power of appointment.
Endacott: That is the suggestion of Mr. Morris and Professor Leach
that Lord Evershed M.R. rejected in my case?
Counsel: Yes. Indeed it is a suggestion that has been made for many
years30 and never accepted. It was viewed with disfavour by Smith J.
30See Ames, The Failure of the 'Tilden Trust' 5 HARv. L. RrV. 389 (1892); Hart,
What is a Trust? 15 L.Q.R. 294; (1899) Smith, Honarary Trusts and the Rule Against
Perpetuities 30 COLUM. L. REV. 60 (1930); Glanville Williams, The Three Certainties
4 MODERN L. REv. 20; Potter, Trusts for Non-charitable Purposes (1949) 13 CONVEY.
(n.s.) 418; Kiralfy, 'Purpose Trusts,' Powers and Conditions 14 CONVEY n.s. 374 (1950);
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in Victoriain Re Producers' Defence Fund."1 In In Re Shaw, 2 Harman
J. did not consider himself at liberty to accept the suggestion, though
he said he would have wished to do so. As you know, in your own
case, Lord Evershed M.R., the only judge to mention the suggestion,
said it could not be regarded as accepted in English law.33
Endacott: Is the statement that the proposition is not accepted the
same thing as rejecting it?
Counsel: Morris and Leach think so. 84 I suppose so. Perhaps it could
still be argued in England. It could certainly be argued elsewhere.
Endacott: What good would it do to regard non-charitable-purpose
trusts as powers of appointment?
Counsel: If express powers of appointment for non-charitable pur-
poses are themselves valid, treating such "trusts" as powers would
have the following consequences: first, the criterion of certainty
would be different; secondly, there would be no anomaly in upholding
certain types of such trust as the lack of compulsion would no longer
be strange; and thirdly, it would harmonise with the application of
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
II
The suggestion is not for treating non-charitable-purpose gifts as
powers if they fail as trusts, but that in the absence of a beneficiary
there is no trust so that all gifts for non-charitable purposes, if valid,
create powers and not trusts.
The degree of certainty of objects required for a valid power of
appointment is different from the degree required in a trust. In Re
Gestetner Settlement,35 Harman J., acknowledging that it would not
L. A. Sheridan Trusts for Non-charitable Purposes 17 CONVEY. (n.s.) 46 (1953); Mar-
shall, The Failure of the Astor Trust 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 151 (1953); Marshall,
Trusts and Powers 35 Canadian BAR REV. 1060, 1064-66; (1957) L. A. Sheridan, Purpose
Trusts and Powers 4 UNIV. OF W. AUSTR. ANN. L. REV. 235 (1958). Apart from the first
edition of the book by Dr. Morris and Professor Leach, see SCOTT, TRUSTS (2nd ed.),
vol. 2, 860. To the contrary are Gray, Gifts for a Non-charitable Purpose 15 HARV.
L. REv. 67 (1902); Eggleston, Purpose Trusts, [1940] 2 Res Judicatac 18.
31 [1954] Argus L.R. 541, 550-51, [1954] V.L.R. 246.
32 [1957] 1 W.L.R. 729, 746, [1957] 1 All E.R. 745, 101 S.J. 408.
33 Re Endacott [1960] Ch. 232, 246, [1959] 3 W.L.R. 799, (1959) 3 All E.R. 562, 103
S.J. 918, 58 L.G.R. 25 (1959).
34 MORRIS & LEACH, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2nd ed.), p. 320.
35 [1953] Ch. 672, [1953] 2 W.L.R. 1033, [1953] 1 All E.R. 1150, 97 S.J. 332. Cf.
Salvesen's Trustees v. Wye 1954 S.C. 440, [1954] S.L.T. 299 (Lords Carmont and Russell
and the Lord President) (Scotland). And see Marshall, Trusts and Powers 35 CAN.
B. REV. 1060, 1066-70 (1957).
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be precise enough to delimit the objects of a trust, upheld as a desig-
nation of the objects of a power of appointment four named individu-
als, the descendants of the settlor's father and of his uncle, spouses,
widows and widowers of any of these people, five charitable bodies,
former employers of the settlor or his wife and widows and widowers
of these former employees, and any director or employee or former
director or employee or the spouse, widow or widower of a former
director or employee of Gestetner Ltd., or of any company of which
the directors for the time being included any one or more of the per-
sons who were for the time being the directors of Gestetner Ltd.; but
excluding the settlor, any spouse or ex-spouse of his and the donees
of the power. Harman J. noted that it was "a class which, it is ad-
mitted, is not one ascertainable at any given time. "36 Yet, said the
learned judge: "If a power be a power collateral, or a power appurte-
nant, or any of these powers which do not impose a trust upon
the conscience of the donee, 7 then I do not think that it can be the
law that it is necessary to know of all the objects in order to appoint
to one of them .... [I]n an ordinary family settlement, the fact that
a father did not know whether one of his sons had married and had
children or not could not possible invalidate the exercise by him of a
power of appointment in favour of those grandchildren of whom he
did know. On the other hand, if it is the trustee's duty to distribute
the fund among a certain number of people, his task being to select
which of these people shall be the objects of his bounty, then it seems
to me there is much to be said for the view that he must be able to
review the whole field in order to exercise his judgment properly." '
This distinction was approved by the Court of Appeal in Inland Rev-
enue Commissioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust,9 where, however,
there was held to be a trust.
In Re Coates,40 Roxburgh J. went a bit further. The testator pro-
36 [1953] Ch. at 683. 37 Cf. Re Rowland's Estate, F.N. 40, post.
38 [1953] Ch. at 684-85.
39 [1955] Ch. 20, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 438, [1954] 3 All E.R. 120, 98 S.J. 588, 35 T.C. 577,
585 (1954).
40 [1955] Ch. 495, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 959, [1955] 1 All E.R. 26, 98 S.J. 871 (1954).
The Supreme Court of Arizona, In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 339, 241 P. 2d
781, 783 (1952) held valid a power in the nature of a trust as follows: "All things
not mentioned in my Will I leave it up to Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Cuthbert, Sr. to distribute
to any of my close friends. Please give generously to Maria Discombe who has been
a faithful maid. . . . If I have not mentioned anything I ought to have mentioned,
I leave it to your judgments Mr. and Mrs. Cuthbert Senior." De Concini, J., with whom
Udall, C. J. and Stanford, Phelps and La Prade, J.J. concurred, took this view despite
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
vided: "If my wife feels that I have forgotten any friend I direct
my executors to pay to such friend or friends as are nominated by my
wife a sum not exceeding f 25 per friend with a maximum aggregate
payment of C250 so that such friends may buy a small memento of
our friendship." And he added: "I have forgotten Richard Hurton
and C. G. Chapple, Mark Francis and Miss Jennings but my wife will
put that right.' 4' The difference between this case and the Gestetner42
Case is that in the Gestetner Case it had been admitted that it could
be told of any given person whether he was an object of the power.
Roxburgh J., however, came to the conclusion that that could also be
determined in Re Coates.4' This was on the basis that objects must be
realized by the wife to be her husband's friends at the date of his
death; that they must be the same sort of friends as those he named
as having been forgotten by him; that the wife must feel he had for-
gotten them; that the individual and aggregate amounts were small,
thus betokening sentiment; and that the gift was for a memento, indi-
cating people the testator would wish to remember him and who
he thought would wish to remember him.
Re Sayer44 turns on the same distinction between powers and trusts.
holding that the objects and subject-matter would have been too uncertain for a trust
and despite holding that the special mention of Maria Discombe precluded equal division
among the objects. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire had taken a different view
in Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 281, 133 At. 168, 45 A.L.R. 143 (1926). The testator
listed a variety of articles of personal property and referred to his trustees' "familiarity
with the property, my wishes and friendships" and competency "to wisely distribute
some portion at least of said property. I therefore give and bequeath to my trustees
all my property embraced within the classification aforesaid in trust to make disposal
by the way of a memento from myself, of such articles to such of my friends as they,
my trustees, shall select." Snow, J., delivering the opinion of the court, held that the
disposition must be treated as an attempt to create either a trust or a power in the nature
of a trust and was void for uncertainty either way. The learned judge referred with
affection and respect to Morice v. Bishop of Durham (F.N. 5, ante) and its progeny.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a somewhat similar view in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Wadell, 293 Mass. 310, 311, 199 N.E. 907, 908 (1936) where property
was given by a testatrix for "paying any person or persons who may have rendered
service in taking care of me or nursing me. What I mean by this is that if there is
anything left, after the payment of my just debts and charges of my last sickness and
burial, and payment of the bequests set forth, if, in the judgment of my said Executors
and Trustees, any person or persons, not already remembered by me herein, may
be caring and doing for me, to be justly and fairly rewarded." This was held void for
uncertainty.
41 [1955] Ch. 495, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 959, [1955] 1 All E.R. 26, 98 S.J. 871 (1954).
42 Cited in F.N. 35.
43 Cited F.N. 43 (also cited in F.N. 40).
44 [1957] Ch. 423, [1957] 2 W.L.R. 261, [1956] 3 All E.R. 600, 101 S.J. 130 (1956).
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So far as the power is concerned in that case, the objects included the
employees and ex-employees of a company, their widows, children
or "other infant dependents" and "other dependent relatives." The
position of the employees and ex-employees and their widows and
children is similar to that of the objects of the power in the Gestetner
case, 45 viz., that though all the objects could not be listed, a sufficiently
clear criterion was provided by which any appointee could be deter-
mined to be within the class or outside it. "Infant dependents" and
"dependent relatives," on the other hand, are expressions (like
"friend" without further indication of detail) of which it could be
said that whether a given person came within either was a matter of
opinion on which reasonable people might differ. Upjohn J. stated,
"It seems to me logically that where an alleged uncertainty lies not in
some uncertainty in fact-for instance, in the impossibility of ascer-
taining ex-employees, as in this case-but lies in the alleged uncertainty
in the language used to describe the qualifications necessary for inclu-
sion among the objects of the power, the problem is the same whether
one has to consider a power of selection or trust to divide.""* In other
words, a clear criterion of what is intra vires must be provided in the
case of power as in the case of a trust, but in the case of a trust one
must go further and be able to list all objects. Impotence to do the
latter, though described as uncertainty, is in reality a shortage of in-
formation, sometimes remediable. Upjohn J. held the power valid.
Having pointed out that it was created by deed and that it was not
governed by cases on wills relating to gifts by a testator to his own
dependent relatives, the learned judge said: "Here is a committee
consisting of three business men, the settlor (the governing director),
Mr. McGee, an employee representing the employees, and the first
plaintiff, the auditor. They are administering a trust which is for the
benefit of employees, ex-employees, and the dependent relatives of
employees or ex-employees. I do not believe, although there may be
difficult cases, that it is impossible to decide who qualifies as a depend-
ent relative. Dealing with the class of employees of this very consid-
erable company and exercising ordinary common sense, I think that
the committee and, if necessary, the court, can come to a conclusion
in any given case whether or not a particular praepositus is properly
described as a 'dependent relative.' ,,,7
45 Cited in F.N. 35. 46 [1957] Ch. 432.
47 [1957] Ch. 436. This distinction, relating to ascertainment of beneficiaries, between
a power and a trust was also discussed in the following English trust cases: Inland
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Endacott: From what you say, it looks as though powers of ap-
pointment are always held valid.
Counsel: No. Three propositions should make the position quite
clear. First, in the case of both trusts and powers a clear criterion of
who qualifies as an object must be provided. The court must be able
to say that it can think of no person or purpose of whom or which it
is in doubt whether he or it would be within the gift or not. Secondly,
in the case of a trust, but not in the case of power, all the objects must
be known to the trustees. The court must be able to say that, at the
inception of the trust, the trustees can probably survey the whole field
of the donor's bounty. I say "probably" because, of course, there is
no theoretical limit to the expense and trouble that may be put into
ascertaining the beneficiaries, but a trust will not be dissipated in
search of its own validity. Thirdly, in the case of neither a trust nor
a power is it necessary for validity that all the objects can actually
be communicated with by the trustee or appointors. So the difference
between trusts and powers lies in the second proposition and a power
may be invalid for uncertainty under the first. This was the case in
Re Gresham's Settlement,48 Re Allan49 and Re Wolff.50
In both the English cases a residence test was prescribed to qualify
as an object of the power. In the Gresham case, Harman J. regarded
as too uncertain the delimitation of the objects as persons with whom
or in whose company the settlor was residing. The learned judge
said: 5' "It seems to me, giving the most benevolent meaning to the
clause that I can, that there must be a number of persons, of whom
it could not be postulated that they were (or were not) within the
dragnet of this rather unusually constructed clause. The question is
whether that is fatal to the clause. I must hold that it is, because of
Revenue Commissioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust (1955) Ch. 20, [1954] 3 W.L.R.
438, (1954) 3 ALL E.R. 120, 98 S.J. 588, 35 T.C. 577, 585 (C.A.); Re Hain's Settlement
(1961) 1 W.L.R. 440, (1961) 1 All E.R. 848, 105 S.J. 154 (C.A.); Re Saxone Shoe Co.,
Ltd.'s Trust Deed [1962] 1 W.L.R. 943, [1962] 2 All E.R. 904, 106 S.J. 687 (Cross, J.).
In all these cases, distaste was expressed for the rule as applied to trusts.
In Australia, on the other hand, it may be that the rule governing powers is that
applied in England to trusts. See Tatham v. Huxtable, 81 C.L.R. 639 (1950) (High
Court); Sandhurst and Northern District Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd.
v. Pitt [1958] V.R. 310 (Victoria, Smith, J.).
48 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 573, (1956) 2 All E.R. 193, 100 S.J. 380 (Harman, J.).
49 [1958] 1 W.L.R. 220, (1958) 1 All E.R. 401, 102 S.J. 140 (Danckwerts, J.).
50 (1958) 16 D.L.R. 2d 527 (Macfarlane, J.) (Canada: British Columbia).
51 [1956] 1 W.L.R. at 578, [1956] 2 All E.R. at 196.
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my decision in In re Gestetner 2 That was a case of a very large class,
but it was conceded that the class, though large, was not one as to the
limits of which there was any doubt: one did not know all the people
who were in it, but one could postulate of any given person whether
he were or were not; and I appear to have said that that made all the
difference. I did decide that case on the ground of certainty. I said
that it was sufficiently certain if an object could be certainly identified
-it being a power, be it said, not accompanied by a duty, a power
collateral, as is this power here. But the bank to whom such a power
is given does have this to consider-whether it will exercise the power
in favour of any postulated person: if the bank is left uncertain
whether the person is an object or not, then there does seem to me
to be imported that very vice of uncertainty which was urged upon
me in In re Gestetner and which in that case I found myself able to
reject."
Endacott: Then would my gift to the North Tawton Parish Coun-
cil for the provision of some useful memorial to myself have been
sufficiently certain for the purposes of a power of appointment?
Counsel: That is very doubtful. "Useful" might be regarded as
being as uncertain as "deserving, ' 5 3 "patriotic' 54 and "benevolent."55
Endacott: Those were cases of trusts, as I remember you saying.
Could "use" not be regarded as being as certain as "for the benefit of"
in discretionary trusts? Moreover, if three businessmen would have
no difficulty in deciding who qualified as a dependent relative,56 why
should a parish council have any difficulty in deciding what was
useful?
Counsel: Both powers and trusts require a clear criterion; but you
may be right that "useful" would be passed on that test and failed
only on the inability to list all possible useful memorials. On the other
hand, if that were so, one would have expected the Court of Appeal
52 [1953] Ch. 672, [1953] 2 W.L.R. 1033, [19531 1 All E.R. 1150, 97 S.J. 332.
53 Re Sutton 28 Ch.D. 464, 54 L.J.Ch. 613, 33 W.R. 519 (1885) (Pearson, J.).
54 A.-G. v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] A.C. 262, 93
L.J.Ch. 231, 131 L.T. 34, 40 T.L.R. 191, 68 S.J. 235 (H.L.).
55 Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance (Incorporated) v. Simpson [1944]
A.C. 341, [1944] 2 All E.R. 60, 113 L.J.Ch. 225, 171 L.T. 141, 60 T.L.R. 492, 88 S.J. 246
(H.L.). Cf. Dulles's Estate (1907) 218 Pa. 162 67 Atl. 49; Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128
Conn. 638, 644, 24 A. 2d 836, 839 (1942), per Maltbie, C. J. in the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut, Avery, Brown, Jennings and Ells, J.J. concurring.
56 Re Sayer [1957] Ch. 423, [1957] 2 W.L.R. 261, [1956] 3 All E.R. 600, 101 S.J. 130
(1956) (Upjohn, J.).
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to give more consideration to the possibility that your "trust" sur-
veyed as a power.
Endacott: The uncertainty position seems uncertain. Then can you
be more definite on the anomaly-eliminating effect of treating gifts
for non-charitable purposes as powers of appointment?
III
Counsel: If there is indeed a general principle that there cannot be
a (noncharitable) trust without a beneficiary to enforce it, one must
ask: what is the effect of upholding gifts for tombs and monuments,
for the support of the testator's animals, and so on? 7 There is no
one who can enforce the gift. The "trustee" may therefore please
himself whether he carries out the purpose or not. If he does, no one
can complain. If he does not carry out the purpose, the "trustee"
cannot keep the unspent "trust" money (unless that is the true con-
struction of the gift). He must hand it over to the beneficiary entitled
under a resulting trust. That is expressly adverted to in two cases. 8
This means that wherever there is an attempt to create a non-chari-
table purpose "trust" the courts are treating it as a resulting trust,
subject (where the non-charitable purpose part of the gift is upheld)
to the interest of the beneficiary under the resulting trust being over-
ridden by the "trustee" (if he wishes) making payments for the
donor's specified purpose. The courts have never called this a power
of appointment, but it looks very like one.
However, it must be remarked that, if the beneficiary under a re-
sulting trust is in general liable to be overridden in these cases, that
is not so in the case of a trust for paying debts, which, so long as no
creditor has acquired special rights as a beneficiary (that is, so long
as it remains a trust for a purpose, not a person), is revocable by the
settlor 59 or after his death.'; It has been suggested"* that all trusts for
non-charitable purposes should be treated likewise, but no court out-
57 See F.N. 6-12, ante.
58 Pettingall v. Pettingall 11 L.J.Ch. 176 (1842) (Knight Bruce, V.-C.); Re Thompson
[1934] Ch. 342, 103 L.J.Ch. 162, 150 L.T. 451 (Clauson, J.).
59 See Wallwyn v. Coutts 3 Mer. 707, 36 E.R. 272, 3 Sir. 14, 57 E.R. 906 (1815)
(Lord Eldon) and other authorities cited in L. A. Sheridan, Trusts for Paying Debts
21 CONVEY. 280, n. (a) (1957).
60 See Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale 2 Russ. & M. 451, 39 E.R. 465 (1831) (Lord
Brougharn) and other authorities cited in L. A. Sheridan, Trusts for Paying Debts
21 CONVEY. 280, 287-88 (1957).
01 Gray, Gifts for a Non-charitable Purpose 15 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1902).
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side the United States has yet treated any valid "trust" for a non-
charitable purpose, other than the payment of debts, as revocable in
the absence of express provision to that effect. Even in the United
States, the revocability has been confined to settlements inter vivoS,62
while most non-charitable purpose trusts held void have been created
by will.
IV
And that leads on to the question of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Where non-charitable purpose trusts have been held valid, it has been
in cases where they are limited to last not longer than the perpetuity
period.6 3 Though courts have not pointed this out, the rule for special
powers of appointment, that they are void if exercisable outside the
perpetuity period, is the same.
V
Endacott: I suppose that if my residuary gift had been drafted as
a power to make a useful memorial to myself, that would have been
valid?
Counsel: There is no direct and conclusive authority that there is
a general rule that powers to appoint in furtherance of a non-chari-
table purpose are valid (if they comply with the general rules of
certainty and perpetuity governing special powers of appointment).
But the indications are that a power need not have persons designated
as objects.
First of all, the validity of a power to appoint for one or more
specified non-charitable purposes is assumed by all writers, including
Gray. 4
Secondly, discretionary trusts are valid, although the discretion may
be not to pay objects but to further the benefit of objects. This is so
whether the case is one of a bare power or a power in the nature of
a trust.
Endacott: So far you have been distinguishing between trusts and
powers and now you speak of a "power in the nature of a trust!"
Counsel: A bare power (which I have been referring to simply as
62 See Scott, TRUSTS (2nd ed.), vol. 4, 2957-59.
03 See the authorities cited in L. A. Sheridan, Trusts for Non-charitable Purposes
17 CoNVEY. 46, 53-61 (1953) and L. A. Sheridan, Discretionary Trusts 21 CONVEY. 55, 63
(1957). See generally, MORRIS & LEAcH, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2nd ed.), 321-27.
64 Gray, Gifts for a Non-charitable Purpose 15 HARV. L. REv. 67 (1902).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
a power) gives the empowered person a discretion whether or not
to exercise it. An authority is called a power in the nature of a trust
where the donee of the power is meant to exercise it, having only a
discretion as to how much (if anything) each object shall get. If
such a power is not exercised, the objects share equally.6" Whether
a power is bare or in the nature of a trust is a matter of construction
of the instrument creating it.
In Re Hain's Settlement,6 the power was to "pay or apply the
income of the trust fund unto or for the maintenance support or
benefit of all or any one or more exclusively of the other or others
of the beneficiaries. . . ." The Court of Appeal held this valid, even
assuming (but not deciding) that this power was in the nature of a
trust. (Presumably if it really were a power in the nature of a trust,
and was not exercised, the court would order equal division "unto"
and not "for the maintenance support or benefit of" the beneficiaries.)
Thirdly, as I have already mentioned, trusts for paying debts and
the "anomalous" non-charitable purpose trusts upheld are treated as
if they were powers of appointment.
Fourthly, powers of maintenance and advancement of beneficiaries
under a trust have always been regarded as valid. In some jurisdictions,
these powers are now statutory.67 In Pilkington v. Inland Revenue
6,5 Cf. Re Rowlands' Estate, F.N. 40, ante.
66 [1961] 1 W.L.R. 440, [1961] 1 All E.R. 848. See also Re Saxone Shoe Co., Ltd's
Trust Deed [1962] 1 W.L.R. 943, [1962] 2 All E.R. 904, 106 S.J. 687 (Cross, J.). Cf.
Re Hunter's Will Trusts [1963] Ch. 372, [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1442, [1962] 3 All E.R. 1050,
106 S.J. 938. There, property was given by the testator to his sister Julia for life, with
remainder to her issue "in such shares and with such trusts for their respective benefit
and such provisions for their respective advancement, maintenance and education
at the discretion of my trustees or of any other person or persons as the said Julia"
might appoint. Cross, J. held that the discretion of the trustees extended to the advance-
ment, maintenance and education, as these must be at someone's discretion, but not to
the trusts for their benefit. The learned judge said, [1963] Ch. at 378-79 [1962] 3 All E.R.
at 1054): "I do not see how one can have a trust for the separate benefit of a particular
appointee which is at the discretion of the trustees." He therefore held ultra vires
an appointment on protective trusts. This decision was made a month after that by the
House of Lords in the Pilkington case (see F.N. 65, post), which was not cited to
Cross, J.
67 In England, the Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 § 19, s. 31 gives power to the
trustees, at their sole discretion, to "pay to his parent or guardian, if any, or otherwise
apply for or towards his maintenance, education, or benefit" income (not otherwise
disposed of) on a beneficiary's future vested or contingent interest under a trust. S. 32
gives trustees a power to pay or apply capital money subject to a trust "for the advance-
ment or benefit, in such manner as they may, in their absolute discretion, think fit,"
of any person who is absolutely or contingently entitled to capital or entitled to capital
subject to divesting or to being overridden by the exercise of a power of appointment
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Commissioners,8 the House of Lords held that exercise of the statu-
tory power in England under section 32 of the Trustee Act, 1925,
need not be by way of payment to the beneficiary, but could be by
way of settlement (thus involving benefits to someone other than the
beneficiary under the principal trust). This was intra vires the purpose
of the power-advancement or benefit of the beneficiary. Lord Rad-
cliffe, the other judges agreeing, said (for the purposes of the rule
against perpetuities): "there is an effective analogy between powers of
advancement and special powers of appointment. ' '69
Finally, in Re Douglas,7 ° the testatrix gave legacies to several soci-
eties, all of which were clearly charitable except for two, viz., the
"Home for Lost Dogs" and the "Society for the Protection of Ani-
mals Liable to Vivisection." She gave her residue on trust to distribute
it "among such charities, societies, and institutions (including or ex-
cluding those herein-before mentioned as may be preferred), and in
such shares and proportions as the said Earl of Shaftesbury shall by
writing nominate. . . ." The Earl nominated 15 3 societies, not includ-
ing the Home for Lost Dogs or the Society for the Protection of
Animals Liable to Vivisection. The Court of Appeal held (i) that all
the gifts were charitable, and (ii) that if the two societies mentioned
were not charitable there was still a valid power of appointment.
Here are some extracts from the judgment of Cotton, L. J. "[W]here
there is a gift without any definite object pointed out, but merely a
description of the character of the object to which the gift is to be
applied, and if that character is not charity, then the Court will not
execute such an indefinite purpose, and it must be considered as if
the legacy had been left to the legatee as a trustee, and with no trust
declared, in which case he would hold it as a trustee for the next of
kin. That really is what is laid down by the case of Morice v. Bishop
of Durham ... ."I' Then there are certain specified things which he
may include in the distribution if he thinks fit. Does that come within
or revocation or subject to his share being diminished by the increase of the class
to which he belongs, and whether he is entitled in possession, remainder or reversion.
68 [1964] A.C. -, [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1951, [19621 3 All E.R. 622, 40 T.C. 416, [1962] 23
T.R. 265, sub nom. Re Pilkington's will trusts.
69 [1964] A.C. -, [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1067.
70 35 Ch.D. 472, 56 L.J.Ch. 913, 56 L.T. 786, 35 W.R. 740, 3 T.L.R. 589 (1887). See
Also Dulles's Estate and Cochran v. McLaughlin, F.N. 52, ante.
71 9 Ves. Jr. 399, 32 E.R. 656 (1804) (Grant, M. R.), 10 Ves. 522, 32 E.R. 947 (1805)
(Lord Eldon).
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the principle of Morice v. Bishop of Durham?72 In my opinion it does
not. All that that case decided was this, that where there is not definite
object pointed out as the object of the trust, then the Court says that
the trust cannot be executed unless the Court can itself determine how
it is to be applied, which it can only do where the object is a charity.
But if there are definite objects pointed out and a discretion is given
to trustees to distribute property amongst those definite objects, in
my opinion that judgment in no way decides that such a gift fails. ' 73
"It would be good if it was limited to a charitable gift, although for
purposes utterly indefinite; and the addition to that of definite pur-
poses, though they are not all charities, will not, in my opinion, make
the ultimate gift bad." 4
You will notice that the first quotation from Cotton L.J. gives rise
to the question: Is a power of appointment bad if, though it would
be possible to say of any appointment that it was intra vires, the power
to appoint is limited by a description of the character of the objects
to which the gift may be applied? An example I have used before is
a legacy of C 10,000 "to be distributed at his absolute discretion by
my trusted friend A among such one or more or all non-charitable
institutions in Oxford as qualify for rating relief. If he distributes none
or only part, then the whole or remainder is to go to B on A's death."
There can be no question of uncertainty. It seems this would be a
valid power of appointment. But I still doubt the validity of a power
to apply money for a useful memorial to the testator. Indeed, it would
seem that in all the reported cases where a non-charitable trust has
failed, with the sole exception of Public Trustee v. Nolan,'75 the
donation would still have failed for perpetuity or uncertainty if
drafted as a power. In the Nolan case, Roper J. held void a gift to
"erect a carillon on similar lines to the one at Avalon, Catalina Island,
California, at such place on Sydney Harbour, or on the foreshores
thereof, or at Park Hill, North Head, as my trustees may deem ex-
pedient, or to join with any other person or public body in erecting
such carillon. . . ." It is to be hoped that one day the issue of the
validity of a power to appoint for non-charitable purposes will be
squarely raised in the courts.
72 35 Ch.D., at 482-83, 56 L.T. at 788.
73 35 Ch.D. 485, 56 L.T. at 789.
74 35 Ch.D. 486, 56 L.T. at 789.
75 43 S.R. (N.S.W.) 169, 60 W.N. (N.S.W.) 84 (1943).
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Endacott: If such a power is indeed valid, why do the courts set
themselves against treating as a power a gift which fails as a trust?
Counsel: The courts say that you cannot construe a valid power
out of an invalid trust.76
Endacott: I can see the point of that, to some extent, in cases where
you could have a trust, for example, for employees, ex-employees
and so forth, and it fails because these people cannot be listed, or
something of that kind. But I cannot see it where the trust the testator
intended is a kind unknown to the law but where the thing can be
done by power. And you yourself said that where non-charitable pur-
pose "trusts" are upheld for animals, for example, the effect is to treat
the gift as a power.
Counsel: Yes, the proposition that a valid power cannot be fash-
ioned out of a void trust is definitely more clearly supportable in the
case of a gift for the maintenance, education or benefit of persons,
as such a power may be bare or in the nature of a trust, while a gift
for other non-charitable purposes can never be in the nature of a
trust. But even in the latter type of case, by purporting to create a
trust the donor has shown that he intended his trustee to be compel-
lable to carry out the purposes. By holding the trustee to have a dis-
cretion the court would be making a new will for the testator.
Endacott: What you are saying is that, in certain circumstances, if
I say my trustee may do something, he may, but if I say he must, then
he can be prevented. Do you really mean that I am supposed to know
enough law to realise that when I say "trust" I mean "must" but not
enough to know that when I mean "must" I cause "can't"? Am I
76See., e.g., Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Broadway Cottages Trust [1955]
Ch. 20, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 438, [1954] 3 All E.R. 120, 98 S.J. 588, 35 T.C. 577, 585 (1954)
(C.A.).
In McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166, 72 N.W. 631, 40 L.R.A. 724, 65 Am. St. Rep. 106
(1897), Pinney, J., giving the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, said
97 Wis. at 176, 172 N.W. at 634: "Although the testator has used language ordinarily
used for the declaration of a trust, it is argued that the court cannot impute to him
the intention of creating a trust simply for the sake of subsequently condemning it.
It is the duty of the court to declare the construction and meaning of this clause of the
will, and then to determine whether it is in conformity with the law."
Scott, TRUSTS (2nd ed.), vol. 2, 850, considers that in all cases where the gift is too
uncertain to be upheld as a trust, a valid power should be held to have been created
if there is sufficient certainty for that. For example, he thinks (p. 853) that the dispo-
sition in Morice v. Bishop of Durham 9 Ves. Jr. 399, 32 E.R. 656 (1804) (Grant, M. R.);
10 Ves. Jr. 522, 32 E.R. 947 (1805) (Lord Eldon), should have been held to grant
a valid power. See also Re Dulles's Estate and Cochran v. McLaughlin, F.N. 52, ante.
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supposed to prefer my trustee being prohibited rather than permitted
when I wanted him compelled?
Counsel: The court cannot speculate. It has your words. How can
it guess what you would have preferred if your primary desires can-
not be literally carried out? Why, your mind might never even have
been directed to the possibility of your gift failing in any way. And
you are dead, anyway, don't forget, when the question arises. So
why should the court be astute to find devious ways to uphold your
little human weaknesses to the exclusion of benefit to living souls?
Endacott: But I wished a useful memorial.
Counsel: If you wanted to do something useful, there are many
ways in which you could have done it without a memorial. If a testa-
tor wants to do something for the public benefit and to establish the
immortality of his name he should pause and consider what is his
predominant motive. Does he want to be a philanthropist, does he
want to be remembered as a philanthropist, or does he want to be
remembered?
He can be a philanthropist by giving to charity. Or to the parish
council or to any public corporation or society. He can perhaps hope
to be remembered for that for a brief period. He can perhaps ask
that his name be associated with whatever his money is spent on. His
name will then probably be remembered for a long time, but he will
not. And in any case, why should he be? It was only "his" money
when he was alive.
But apart from the anomalous and exceptional non-charitable pur-
pose trusts upheld as concessions to human weakness, classes which
no English court lower than the House of Lords is going to expand;
apart, too, from drafting non-charitable gifts expressly as bare special
powers of appointment; there are a few devices open to the testator
who wants to withhold his money from persons and charities. 7 Let
his legal adviser select carefully and public policy will quail at the
contest.
Endacott: This, then, is your message in the end. I was thwarted
on machinery, not policy. I tried to do something useful and I failed
to qualify even as an anomaly.
77 See L. A. Sheridan Trusts for Non-charitable Purposes 17 CONVEY. (n.s.) 46, 64
(1953).
